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	IN THE SUPERIOR COURT (	OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA	
12		OUNTY OF YAVAPAI	
13			
14	STATE OF ARIZONA,	) No. P1300CR20081339 )	
15	Plaintiff,	) Div. 6	
16	Vs.	) DEFENDANT'S POSITION ON	
17		) COURT'S ORDER OF AUGUST	
	STEVEN CARROLL DEMOCKER,	) 13, 2010 REGARDING	
18	Defendant.	) HARTFORD INSURANCE ) EVIDENCE	
19	Defendant.	) EVIDENCE	
20		Ć	
		_ ) UNDER SEAL	
21			
22	Steven DeMocker, by and through co	ounsel, hereby files his position on the	
23	Court's Under Seal Order of August 13, 2010, regarding Hartford Insurance evidence.		
24	This position is based on the due process clause, the confrontation clause, the right to a		
25	fair trial, the Eighth Amendment and Arizor	na counterparts, Arizona Rules of Evidence,	
26			
27		RECEIVED	
28		AUG 1 8 2010	
	I	DIVISION 6	

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure and the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

## **MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES**

On August 13, 2010, the Court issued an Under Seal Ruling regarding evidence relating to the disposition of the proceeds of the Hartford Insurance Policies. Counsel had only a few minutes to review the three page document prior to responding in court that day. The conclusion to the Ruling states that:

- (1) Evidence as to the ultimate disposition of the insurance proceeds would be admissible. Acknowledging that the defense has objected to the admission of all insurance or disclaimer evidence that arguably would be negative to the Defendant's position. The Court also notes that the conditional stipulation suggested by the defense includes such evidence. However, the Court also rules that evidence of the amount involved is admissible.
- (2) Subject to the limitations stated in part (3) of this Ruling, evidence relating to a witness's reason for his or her involvement in the transfer of the insurance funds is admissible.
- (3) As the Court has previously ruled, any evidence or argument offered to suggest that the transfer of funds occurred in an unlawful manner, whether in a criminal or civil sense, is not admissible.

After a brief review of the Order in the time allowed, the defense noted the apparent confusion created by paragraph (2). The defense understood that prior orders of the Court had limited "evidence relating to a witness's reason for his or her involvement in the transfer of the insurance funds" beyond the limitations in paragraph (3) of the Order. The Court assured counsel that "I don't think there's anything

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27 28 inconsistent with what I've said at all so far. I don't see that" and requested the parties carefully review the Ruling. (8/13/2010 Under Seal Transcript, pg. 33:20-23).

During the hearing on August 13, the Court explained that "[t]he jury was told. you know, you're going to find out that the girls got these funds. So that really suggests there's some relevance here. Well, talking about a disclaimer and what it really means. and I hope I at least made clear of how I think explaining the disclaimer really gets to the bottom of the problem, what is a disclaimer, and I talked about legal disclaimer and what that would mean versus what would a jury would take from that statement, just common dictionary definition." (Id. at 21:15-24). The Court also went on to state "[t]hen you're getting down to what can legitimately be argued to say that everybody, you know, that is on the defense was somehow manipulated or worked with Mr. DeMocker to obtain these funds, there's no evidence of that, and Mr. Butner, I've indicted that could not be argued. I mean, from what I've seen here that can't be argued." (Id. at 16:13-19).

Defense counsel have now had the opportunity to carefully review the Court's August 13 Ruling, as well as the Court's prior rulings about limitations on the Hartford Insurance evidence. With this review, and with the understanding that the Ruling's limitations governing evidence relating to "a witness's reason for his or her involvement in the transfer of the insurance funds" are consistent with the Court's prior rulings, the defense continues to believe that there is no conflict, no need for a waiver by Mr. DeMocker, and that all defense counsel are ready to resume trial on August 24, 2010.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This position is also based on counsel's understanding from the State that any "criminal investigation" is on hold and will be referred outside of Yavapai County; and on Mr. Butner's representation made August 13, 2010, that Bar counsel indicated it was likely to defer

<sup>2</sup> As early as November 2008, the State had emails from Steve DeMocker to Hartford and a recorded phone call with Hartford that indicated that Mr. DeMocker was seeking to disclaim benefits and get the insurance proceeds to his daughter.

I. The Court's Prior Rulings Limiting the Hartford Insurance Evidence -Prohibiting Evidence of Allegations of Misconduct by Defense Counsel and Precluding Evidence of the Details of the Transfer of Funds from the Trust and Estate

Although the State says it first learned of the distribution of the Hartford Life Insurance proceeds to Katie and Charlotte DeMocker on June 3, 2010<sup>2</sup>, it waited to raise the issue of a possible conflict until it filed a July 12, 2010, Motion for Determination of Counsel. Thereafter, the Court received voluminous documents and a chronology from the State and held under-seal hearings on July 14, July 16, July 20, August 3, August 4, August 11, August 12 and August 13, 2010. During these hearings, the Court made a number of significant rulings as to the scope and admissibility of the Hartford Insurance issues.

On July 16, the Court held that there would be no accusations of wrongdoing by the defense team and that the details of Mr. DeMocker's efforts to obtain the Hartford Insurance proceeds after Carol Kennedy's death were not relevant or admissible under Rule 403 and 404(b). The Court held that "this trial would not involve accusations in any fashion of wrongdoing by the defense team. It is not. That, in itself, eliminates a lot of the records right there." (7/16/10 Under Seal Transcript, 6:6-9). That same date, the Court also stated that "I am not saying, Mr. Butner, that there are instances where subsequent events — and I mean by 'subsequent,' after the actual incident — there may be cases where there is relevance to the efforts to obtain monies to pay defense attorneys and pay for defense. And there just is not that showing in this case, whatsoever, to make the relevance such that the probative value would stand up against the very high danger of unfair prejudice, based on the showing that I have here, and also the 404(b) aspects, as well. This is what I have got right now. So that means that the

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disclosure cannot be used, again late disclosure, but I am looking primarily at 403 and 404(b), that disclosure cannot be used for the improper purpose." (*Id.* 7:2-15).

During a July 20 under seal proceeding, the Court clarified its earlier ruling, "[i]f I could clarify a bit what I thought my ruling was, and I didn't say it in this way, but essentially there is not going to be a large mini trial on the details of how attorneys fees got paid. That is not going to happen." (7/20/10 Under Seal Transcript, 8:18-22). The Court also held that "[t]here is not going to be this detailed discussion of the trust, estate, checks from here to there and this person to that person. None of that is coming in in this case." (Id. 10:10-13). Later still, the Court indicated that "[t]he scheme is not what is going to be any part of this trial. Period. Clear. No part of the trial, you portraying that as some kind of scheme. I don't know how to say that more clear." (Id. 25:13-16). And further, "[t]here is one issue in play, and that is somewhere between the stipulations or one stipulation that's the issue that's in play, not reopening any kind of detailed account of where the money -- how the money went and where it went specifically. That is not going to be the subject of this trial." (Id. 41:13-18).

Trial resumed on July 21 with these understandings. After the Court was closed on August 2, the State filed a Motion for Protective Order and Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that alleged for the first time that it has initiated a criminal investigation of defense counsel (and perhaps others) and

On August 3 and 4, the Court held additional under-seal hearings. The Court never wavered from its initial ruling that the trial would not involve allegations of wrongdoing by the defense counsel and that evidence about the details of the transfer of funds would be prohibited. At the August 4 hearing, the Court indicated that it understood that an argument from the State that Mr. DeMocker had "dominion and control" of the Hartford Insurance proceeds would place the defense in a precarious

position. "I remember that exchange very well and I remember, Mr. Sears, you indicating you know, Mr. Butner is going to get up and talk about dominion and control and this whole master plan and I said something about if he does that it would likely be stricken." (August 4 Under Seal transcript, 78:20-24).<sup>3</sup> "[O]nce an argument comes in that this is all some kind of a master plan, that puts the defense in a position of having to say how did this exactly come a -- I am sorry. How did this exactly come about? What was our role in it?" (*Id.* 82:10-13). The Court explained the limits it was placing on the State in discussing a jail call between Mr. DeMocker and his daughter Katie, "I think you can go into things into that interview. I do, but to that -- if there is going to be an argument about this master plan and all was way back and just happened to go to attorney fees, we have got an issue that I don't think can be solved." (*Id.* 82:16-20).

After further briefing, the Court held still further under-seal hearings on August 11, 12, and 13. On August 11, the Court reminded the State, "I have ruled that the trial is not going to be about wrongdoing by the defense attorneys. There aren't going to be allegations of defense attorneys collaborating or somehow being manipulated in a criminal endeavor. I have not seen proof of that." (August 11, 2010 Partial Transcript, Under Seal 7:14-19). The Court continued, "I've said that a trial that would involve allegations that making this document or taking this step was somehow unlawful — and many times I'm saying illegal when I mean criminally unlawful. But any type of evidence that goes to this is some kind of a breach of trust, something like that, that's not what the trial is going to be about. (Id. 8:9-16). The Court went on to reiterate that issues of the "machinations" of the trust and estate transfer of monies would not be permitted at trial. "But reading that these opinions, I don't see how it relates directly to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Court also noted, "[b]ut that's not any kind of final ruling. You need to understand that, Mr. Butner. And that does interject some uncertainty in this whole process and I fully appreciate that and one of the things I am trying to work with, with all the other things that need decision in the case, is guidance to be able to deal with that because it does bear on the other thing we are talking about here, these allegations of misconduct." (79:5-12).

this case. That's my concern with it Mr. Butner. I just don't see a direct relation to this case unless it is framed in that argument of the defense team is some how being manipulated to participate in a scheme. Just the mechanics of how the money got transferred whether or not there was some irregularities is how it was characterized I just don't see why this has to be a part of this. I'm having real difficulty with that. I don't know that anyone can say any more." (Id. 19:5-14) (emphasis added).

On August 13, the Court issued an under-seal Ruling indicating that it was to be read consistent with these prior rulings.<sup>4</sup> After careful review of this Ruling and the Court's prior rulings, and with the understandings that 1) the trial will not include allegations of wrongdoing by defense counsel, and 2) the trial will not include evidence reading to the details of the transfer of funds from the trust and estate, counsel continue to believe that there is no conflict, no need for a waiver, and trial should proceed as scheduled on August 24, 2010.

## II. The State's Continued Plan to Present Evidence Contrary to the Court's Orders.

Even after hearing the Court's prior rulings and after having read the Ruling on August 13, the State inexplicably responded that it still intends to attempt to present evidence of details of the transfer of funds from the trust and estate, in violation of the Court's orders. At the hearing on August 13, Mr. Butner told the Court "[w]e have one witness that was immunized already that was immunized for other reasons and she will testify about this, ... she will testify about the insurance proceeds under a grant of immunity also, and that's Renee Girard, and she was involved in the payment of those proceeds directly into an account, \$350,000 directly into an account owned by the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Court also stated that "I'm saying that because I know what Mr. Butner has indicated that he wants to argue, and I think it's at that time—it's at that time that the question of participation by specific attorneys could be interjected," citing *Bible*. (8/13/2010 Transcript 4:2-3). Counsel intend to brief the issue of limitations on closing argument shortly for the Court.

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defendant that he of course jointly owned with his daughter Charlotte. (8/13/10 Transcript 19:3-11, emphasis added). As detailed above, and as defense counsel understand the Court's rulings, this proposed testimony (and any similar to it from any witness) would be prohibited and the State's attempt to introduce such testimony would be a violation of the Court's orders and further grounds for a mistrial.

## **CONCLUSION**

With this review, and with the understanding that the limitations to evidence related to "a witness's reason for his or her involvement in the transfer of the insurance funds" are consistent with the Court's prior rulings, the defense continues to believe that there is no conflict, no need for a waiver by Mr. DeMocker, and counsel are ready to proceed to trial on the date of scheduled resumption, August 24, 2010.

DATED this 6 day of August, 2010.

By:

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1	ORIGINAL of the foregoing hand delivered for
2	filing this 18 day of August, 2010, with:
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4	Clerk of the Court Yavapai County Superior Court
5	120 S. Cortez Prescott, AZ 86303
6	11050000, 7127 00505
7	COPIES of the foregoing hand delivered this
8	this 18 day of August, 2010, to:
9	The Hon. Warren R. Darrow
10	Judge Pro Tem B 120 S. Cortez
11	Prescott, AZ 86303
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13	Joseph C. Butner, Esq. Jeffrey Paupore, Esq.
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